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Abstract
During the 1990s Croatia went through the process of transition to market economy mostly following the 
Washington Consensus policy guidelines. Since the period before the last global financial crisis, Croatia 
has shown almost no convergence to developed European Union member states and has been among the 
least developed ones. This paper examines the causes of Croatian development lag, while providing an 
overview of contemporary development policies and international production fragmentation trends that 
affected them. The paper points out to several important factors that shaped the Croatian development 
path. Expectations from foreign capital were overrated, as the foreign direct investment consisted mainly of 
brownfield investment in large monopolistic companies and was rarely directed to export-oriented sectors. 
Accession to the World Trade Organisation was followed by stronger growth of imports than exports and 
joining the European Union did not bring economic growth as fast as expected. Lack of industrial policy 
implementation has led Croatia to deindustrialisation and increasing importance of the tourism sector as 
a form of the Dutch disease. 
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The Dilemma over Washington Consensus Guidelines or 
Industrial Policy: Lessons from Croatia 
Dilema između primjene smjernica Washingtonskog 
konsenzusa ili industrijske politike: primjer Hrvatske 
Sažetak
Hrvatska je potkraj prošlog stoljeća prošla kroz proces tranzicije na tržišno gospodarstvo uglavnom 
slijedeći smjernice Washingtonskog konsenzusa. U razdoblju prije posljednje globalne financijske 
krize, Hrvatska nije pokazala gotovo nikakvu konvergenciju s razvijenim članicama Europske unije 
te je pripadala skupini najmanje razvijenih članica. Ovaj rad istražuje uzroke zaostajanja Hrvatske, 
pružajući istovremeno pregled suvremenih razvojnih politika i međunarodnih trendova fragmentacije 
proizvodnje koji su na njih utjecali. Rad ukazuje na nekoliko važnih čimbenika koji su oblikovali hrvatski 
razvojni put. Očekivanja od priljeva stranog kapitala bila su precijenjena, jer su se izravna inozemna 
ulaganja uglavnom sastojala od brownfield ulaganja u velika monopolistička poduzeća i rijetko su 
bila usmjerena na izvozno orijentirane sektore. Pristupanje Svjetskoj trgovinskoj organizaciji popraćen 
je snažnijim rastom uvoza od izvoza, a pridruživanje Europskoj uniji nije donijelo gospodarski rast 
onako brzo kako se očekivalo. Nedostatak implementacije industrijske politike doveo je Hrvatsku do 
deindustrijalizacije i sve veće važnosti turističkog sektora kao oblika nizozemske bolesti.
 
Ključne riječi: Washingtonski konsenzus, industrijska politika, globalni lanci vrijednosti, nizozemska 
bolest
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1. Introduction
Washington Consensus is a set of guidelines 
for developing countries recommended at the 
beginning of the 1990s and offering a path to 
economic development. While it considered 
liberalised trade, privatisation, macroeconomic 
stability and pricing policies as a prerequisite 
for good economic performance, it also gave a 
turn from an important role of the government 
to minimising its role after succeeding in the 
mentioned tasks (Williamson 1990; Stiglitz, 1998). 
Thus, it promoted neoliberal economic policy with 
the minimal role of the state, arguing that imperfect 
markets are always superior to imperfect states.
At the end of the 20th century its recommendations 
were largely followed by a range of developing 
countries, especially those in transition process 
to market economies. Following the neoliberal 
orthodoxy has brought different results among 
countries. The literature has shown several lacks 
of this approach as well as needed actions to 
complement the liberalisation process, but not 
many changes have been made across a range 
of developing countries to improve their future 
growth prospects. While cross-national research is 
underlined to be essential to explain the different 
responses to the market reforms (Kaltwasser, 2011; 
Teichman, 2019), research in this field mainly 
regards to Latin American, African and Asian 
countries (Heidhues and Obare, 2011; Galchu, 
2018; Ban and Blyth, 2013). 
Some research point out that Europe was going 
further than any other country or integration in 
internalising prescriptions of the Washington 
consensus, which can be seen as a primary culprit 
for relatively low growth since the financial crisis 
(Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2013).  Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries have not been largely 
explored in this context, although they have shown 
different development paths in the last thirty years 
since the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse 
of Yugoslavia. Most of the CEE countries joined the 
European Union (EU) at the beginning of the 21st 
century, while Croatia did it a decade later. However, 
in the case of Croatia, following the Washington 
Consensus guidelines did not bring success and 
convergence with developed EU member states, as 
expected. 
In this paper, the case of Croatia is explored, which 
has shown almost no convergence to the EU 
developed countries during the last few decades. 
The paper discusses the main general pitfalls 
of Croatian development path following the 
Washington Consensus recommendations, while 
giving a comparison to some of the other EU New 
Member States (NMS) in the Central and Eastern 
European region. The main goal of this paper is 
to provide a review of contemporary development 
policies and an overview of the Croatian path 
choosing the neoliberal Washington consensus 
prescriptions over industrial policy approach in the 
last thirty years.
The paper consists of four parts. After the 
introduction, a literature review of development 
policies after the 1950s in the context of 
international production fragmentation process 
is presented. The part that follows focuses on the 
case of Croatia and explores its development policy 
outcomes through overview of selected economic 
indicators. The conclusion summarises the main 
lessons for developing countries and gives 
recommendations for further research. 
2. Overview of industry transformation 
trends and development policy options
2.1. International production fragmentation
The ongoing process of global industry 
transformation has been strongly connected with 
the changes in transportation and communication 
technologies, reduction of tariff rates through 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiation 
rounds but also with policies that developing 
and developed countries were undertaking that 
enabled the transformation. According to Baldwin 
(2013), this process can be broadly divided in two 
phases: (1) "trade-led globalization", and (2) “factory 
separation”. The first unbundling called "trade-led 
globalization" began with the invention of the 
steam engine and ended in the 1970s. Within 
this phase, the separation of production from 
consumption has occurred. It was primarily enabled 
by the decline in transport costs, and its main 
characteristic was asymmetric industrialization and 
development in the world, leading to increasing 
inequality. 
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The second unbundling referred to as “factory 
separation” was determined mostly by the impact 
of the revolution in the field of information and 
communication technologies which enabled 
organizing production in geographically dispersed 
locations, thus making use of each countries 
comparative advantages within a global value 
chain (GVC) (Horner and Nadvi, 2018). This phase 
is characterized by the transfer of the know-how 
from developed to developing countries. Not rarely, 
operations moved to developing countries located 
near developed countries as the foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows show. 
This process of geographical fragmentation of 
production started in the 1960s and intensified 
at the end of the 20th century, affecting the 
gross trade figures, as product components cross 
borders several times before being purchased 
on the consumer market. The highest growth in 
intermediate goods trade was recorded after 1988 
(Sturgeon and Gereffi, 2012). The Uruguay round of 
GATT trading negotiations and the founding of the 
WTO in 1995 has contributed to trade liberalization, 
with the ultimate goal of creating global prosperity 
through the globalization process (Stiglitz, 2009). 
There was also a substantial increase in foreign 
direct investment that followed in the 1990s. 
According to the World Bank data (2019), in the 
1990 global FDI inflow was USD 196,32 billion, 
in the 2000 USD 1.48 trillion, reaching its highest 
level in 2007, before the onset of the global 
financial crisis, when it was USD 3.14 trillion. For 
almost five decades, the EU countries had a leading 
position in the FDI inflows. However, in 2017 and 
2018, China outperformed the EU.
Deindustrialization referring to the decline in 
industrial employment share, and the share of 
the manufacturing industry in GDP has been the 
characteristic of developed countries since the 
1950s, but in the last decades also of developing 
countries, mostly being premature due to their 
low levels of GDP per capita (Treggena, 2015). In 
some of the developing countries it is accompanied 
by the “Dutch disease” through replacing its 
production in the manufacturing industry with 
primary production resulting from the discovery 
of natural resources, but also growth in services, 
including tourism (Palma, 2005). 
The processes of industrialization and de-
industrialization have been greatly influenced 
by the emergence of GVCs, especially since 
the early 1990s (Milberg et al., 2014). These 
developments have led to income redistribution 
among developed and developing countries. 
While the first have started deindustrialising, the 
latter have started industrialising. FDI enabled 
technology and knowledge transfer to developing 
countries, and their engagement in GVCs without 
the need to create their national chains facilitated 
and accelerated their industrialisation. However, 
not all the developing countries have used 
these opportunities and increased the share of 
manufacturing in their GDP. 
Given the technological dynamics and tradability 
of manufacturing sector products, it is specific to 
any other sector (Rodrik, 2016). Having in mind that 
manufacturing contributes to economic growth 
like no other sector (Tregenna, 2009; Szirmai 
and Verspagen, 2015), leads to the permanent 
lagging of developing countries not specializing 
in tasks within the manufacturing industry GVCs. 
Without the manufacturing sector, development 
opportunities for developing economies that are 
deindustrializing prematurely are largely reduced 
(Tregenna, 2009; Tregenna, 2015). 
2.2. The evolution of development policies
After the Second World War, many developing 
countries have sought to accelerate their 
development by restricting imports of industrial 
products to ensure the domestic market for infant 
industries. Through import substitution these 
countries strived to change their position in the 
world division of labour, where they specialised in 
food and raw materials exports, while had to import 
manufacturing goods from developed European 
countries and the United States (Baer, 1972). 
Thus, the most significant argument for import 
substitution industrialization was the protection 
of the infant industry in imperfect markets. This 
development model implied that countries were 
building the value chain starting with downstream 
activities and moving upstream (Baldwin, 2013). 
This thinking especially dominated policies in 
Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s (Baer, 1972). 
Several problems related to this model emerged, 
such as permanent balance of payments deficit, 
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financial crisis, sectoral disequilibrium, persisting 
social and economic inequalities (Alarcon and 
McKinley, 1992). As a result, this strategy has shown 
to be highly ineffective for development, and some 
economists, as Stiglitz (1998) points out, put the 
blame on the government failures to create internal 
competition more than the protectionist measures. 
At the same time, from 1950s to 1970s export-
oriented industrialisation emerged as a new policy 
direction led by Japan and Germany and adopted 
by several developing economies in East Asia (Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore), known 
as the East Asian Tigers (Palley, 2013). Their focus 
was not on their internal market, as in the former 
policy, but on the developed countries, where their 
products were meant to be sold. The arguments of 
their export orientation included the importance 
of relative abundance of production factors for 
specialisation, while stressing the benefits of 
openness for controlling rent seeking and for 
growth (Palley, 2013). Palley (2013) points out 
integration into the global economy, undervalued 
exchange rate and suppression of wages and social 
standards as key elements of this strategy.
Most arguments in favour of an export-led growth 
strategy emphasize the role of trade openness, 
arguing that countries that are more involved 
in international trade are more likely to achieve 
long-term economic growth, than countries that 
are less open to international trade. The success 
of East Asian Tigers was used as prescription of 
opposing development schools, those supporting 
free market outward orientation, but also those 
supporting aggressive protectionist measures 
(Easterly, 1995). What is important to point out, 
although these countries were following some 
of the main measures of the neoliberal policies 
that were later coined as Washington Consensus, 
contrary to its recommendations, they have also 
designed industrial policies in order to close 
the technological gap between them and more 
advanced countries (Stiglitz, 1998).
With the range of economic, political, and 
ideological changes at the end of the 1980s, 
there was an emergence of neoliberal economic 
ideas promoting deregulation, liberalization, and 
privatization as key economic measures that would 
lead to economic development. This led to forming 
a framework including a set of economic policy 
recommendations for developing countries, known 
as the Washington Consensus. Agreed among 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank and 
the US Department of the Treasury, it emerged in 
1989 with the main aim of helping Latin American 
countries overcome the debt crisis. John Williamson 
(1990) proposed a package of measures deemed 
necessary to cope with the crisis. His approach 
consisted of 10 axiomatic generalizations which 
were generally agreed by scholars and practitioners 
concerned with economic growth in developing 
countries (Gore, 2000). The approach advocated for 
macroeconomic discipline (especially fiscal), market 
orientation, and openness as a basis for economic 
recovery. It included measures of trade and 
investment liberalization, tax reform, competitive 
exchange rates, privatization, deregulation, and 
market interest rates. 
Soon, Washington Consensus, predominantly 
advocating for privatization, liberalisation and 
macroeconomic stability mostly considering 
price stability (Stiglitz, 2004), became not only 
a substitute for central planning and import 
substitution industrialization strategies, but was 
considered as a typical example of neoliberal 
economic ideas proposed to be implemented in all 
developing countries across the world. It exerted 
some pressure on developing countries to shift 
from import-substitution strategies to export-
oriented strategies, leading to the involvement 
of third world countries in global economic flows 
through investment and growth of their capabilities 
(Gereffi, 2001). Thus, given the political, economic, 
and ideological changes taking place in Europe 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, market-led 
development strategy was implemented by most of 
these countries as well. 
Washington Consensus was focusing on the 
first order importance issues and gave an easily 
reproducible framework to establish prerequisites 
for development, but it did not include the 
improvement of technology issue or offer an answer 
to important questions for long-term development 
of individual countries taking into account their 
specifics (Stiglitz, 1998). Some scholars disagreed 
with the idea that the proposed ten reform measures, 
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which advocated a set of uniform economic reforms, 
were appropriate for all developing countries at all 
times and stages of development and sufficient 
to reach high development growth rates. In the 
early 1990s, budgets became more balanced, 
inflation lower, external indebtedness declined and 
economic growth was recorded. Nevertheless, at 
the same time, unemployment increased in many 
countries, and poverty expanded. Market openness 
has made countries more vulnerable to the effects 
of globalization, especially to the phenomenon 
of short-term capital inflows and capital flight. 
The crisis of the late 1990s in East Asia and 
Latin America showed downsides of Washington 
Consensus ideas, particularly of the one relying 
on foreign capital (Birdsall and Fukuyama, 2011). 
Literature also points out that most of the countries 
used some form of industrial policy although they 
nominally followed the Washington Consensus 
agenda. 
Other strategies, such as Beijing Consensus (Ramo, 
2004), were indorsing more interventionist visions, 
while choosing a gradual approach rather than 
“one big shock-therapy leap”. Beijing Consensus 
emphasised the innovation-based development 
while pointing out sustainability and level of 
equality, not only GDP per capita as measures of 
economic success. It also included the theory of 
self-determination regarding USA, thus giving 
an opposition to the Washington Consensus and 
striving to spread Chinese influence by example. 
The last global financial crisis made it clear that the 
Washington Consensus era and its market-oriented 
development model are outdated, and the only 
question was what policies were going to replace 
it (Rodrick, 2006). In parallel, the WTO’s role has 
diminished in comparison to liberalization through 
regional integrating, the productive capacity of 
developing countries has increased and there has 
been financialization of non-financial corporations. 
As a consequence of these changes, the political 
power of developing countries is growing (Milberg 
et al, 2014). 
Meanwhile, industrial policy has started its return 
to the centre of the development debate (Stiglitz, 
1998.; Rodrik, 2008). In the last ten years, industrial 
policy gained new attention from economic 
policymakers in developed and developing 
countries (e.g. Robinson, 2010; Warwick, 2013; 
Rodrik, 2016; Stiglitz, 2017). 
There are several reasons for the increasing 
interest in industrial policy. First is the situation 
after the financial crisis, which needed a solution 
to high unemployment rates and economic 
growth. Then, the success of East and Southeast 
Asian countries, which increased competition 
with developed countries, but also encouraged 
those less developed to join the GVCs. Also, the 
fear of premature deindustrialization made the 
industrial policy a necessary element of economic 
development (Andreoni and Tregenna, 2018). The 
key elements of industrial policy have changed 
significantly. Whereas in the past (up to the 1970s) 
industrial policy included import substitution, 
protection of infant industry and development of 
individual sectors and selective opening of the 
market to competition, in the 1980s and 1990s the 
focus was on the horizontal policy. Recently, key 
elements have been completely changing. Since 
2000, specialization and increasing productivity 
through the knowledge economy and GVC have 
been one of the primary goals of developing 
economies. Today's industrial policy requires a focus 
on the relationship between local and global actors. 
It must take into account the interests, power, and 
reach of leading networks, accepting international 
business networks as an appropriate area for play. 
UNCTAD (2019) points out that modern industrial 
policies often address myriad topics beyond 
conventional industrial development and structural 
transformation, including GVC integration and 
upgrading, knowledge economy development, 
sustainable development goals and competitive 
positioning for the Fourth industrial revolution. 
Economic development usually entails upgrading 
within GVCs, implying changes in the production 
structure, involving the transformation of the 
industry towards activities that have higher value-
added, which is an important form of contemporary 
industrialization (Milberg et al., 2014). Lin (2015) 
proposed “new structural economics framework” 
which stresses the importance of differences in 
the optimal industrial structure for countries in 
different stages of development. These differences 
are mostly addressed to their relative endowment 
structures and comparative advantages according 
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to them. It still stresses the importance of reliance 
on the market as the optimal resource allocation 
mechanism at any given stage of development, 
but acknowledges the importance of facilitating 
role played by the state in the process of industrial 
upgrading and structural transformation (Lin, 
2015). Peneder and Streicher (2018) emphasise 
that institutions and policies that can influence 
the relative abundance of skills, the design of 
innovation systems and the quality of infrastructure 
that supports development, affect the comparative 
advantages of countries.
Although many developing countries have modified 
and modernized their industrial policies, their 
implementation and real effects are questionable. 
Upgrading to higher value-added activities is not 
a simple task as it requires adequate infrastructure, 
political, and institutional frameworks to support 
reforms. In contrast to Washington Consensus 
development model, based on the primacy of 
market liberalism, the limited role of the state, 
and outward orientation, emerging trends in 
development policy reveal and emphasise a 
different, more state-interventionist path, that 
a range of countries began to follow at the turn 
of the century and continued afterwards which 
resulted in reaching higher growth rates (Onis and 
Senses, 2005). 
3. Development path of Croatia
In this part, Croatia’s development path since the 
1990s will be analysed. Until the 1990s, Croatia 
was a part of Yugoslavia, thus having a centrally 
planned economy, mostly not following its 
comparative advantages and having very limited 
international trade outside of Yugoslavia. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, together with other former 
members of Yugoslavia and several countries 
belonging to the Soviet Union in the CEE, Croatia 
started the transition to the market economy and 
building a new economic, ideological, political and 
social order. Development in the last 30 years in 
these countries can be divided into three phases 
(Grieveson et al., 2019). The initial „shock therapy“ 
at the beginning of the 1990s brought a steep GDP 
decrease and it took years for their economies to 
recover to the 1989 levels. The second phase, so 
called „the boom years“, included the years from 
the beginning of 21st century to the financial crisis, 
when most of these economies recorded significant 
growth. The third phase covers the years after the 
financial crisis when most of the countries recorded 
growth and also experienced positive outcomes.
The transition of a large number of countries in 
the region gives an opportunity to test a range of 
economic theories and further analyse the sources 
of their different development paths. The Visegrad 
economies (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovakia) have experienced a significant growth, 
especially in the last two decades since joining 
the EU, while on the contrary, Croatia has been 
lagging. This trend is shown in Table 1 through 
a comparison of the Croatian GDP per capita, 
expressed as percentage of other economies GDP 
per capita, in the selected years since 1995.
At the end of the five-year Homeland War in 
Croatia, which significantly and adversely affected 
its development, GDP per capita was at the level 
of only 15% of German's GDP and at the level of 
24% of the average GDP per capita in the EU (when 
calculated in current prices). On the other side, 
when compared to Visegrad countries, only Czech 
Republic had higher GDP per capita than Croatia, 
while when comparing to Bulgaria and Romania, 
Croatian GDP was more than twice as large. 
These figures started to change quickly through 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018
EU 24.37% 26.70% 36.13% 41.32% 36.51% 40.69%
Germany 15.27% 20.55% 30.32% 33.35% 28.46% 30.85%
Czech Republic 83.72% 81.06% 78.83% 70.36% 66.50% 64.43%
Hungary 107.83% 105.17% 93.89% 106.45% 94.21% 93.29%
Poland 131.58% 108.47% 131.17% 110.62% 93.70% 96.40%
Slovak Republic 100.97% 90.19% 90.16% 83.96% 72.80% 76.07%
Bulgaria 215.89% 302.70% 271.89% 203.66% 168.44% 160.35%
Romania 293.63% 293.57% 227.83% 169.76% 131.22% 120.88%
Source: authors' calculation, World Bank (2019).
Table 1 Croatian GDP per capita (current $) expressed as a percentage (%) of other countries GDP per capita (current $) 
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the 2000s. In 2018, Croatia's GDP per capita was 
31% of German's and 41% of the EU's, showing 
convergence over time. On the other side if we 
compare the figures with Visegrad countries, we 
can easily see they have all significantly improved 
a lot more than Croatia, and that Croatia is falling 
behind. Bulgaria and Romania have also converged 
on a faster track, and their lagging has decreased 
significantly, which can lead to surpassing Croatia if 
their GDP per capita growth continues at the same 
pace.
All of these countries have nominally followed 
the Washington Consensus and most importantly, 
opened their economies to foreign direct 
investment and trade. However, the question is 
what made the difference for Croatia and caused 
its lagging? Through a short overview of other 
economic indicators that show the integration 
in the global economy we strive to grasp general 
trends that led to Croatian lagging, and give 
an overview of the Croatian development path 
following the Washington Consensus guidelines. 
As the Table 2 shows, in 1995 the least opened 
among CEE countries were Poland, Bulgaria and 
Romania. Substantial changes over two decades 
have occurred. However, Romania still holds the 
last place (86%), followed by Croatia (101%) and 
by Poland (107%). Somewhat lower openness 
indicators in the case of Poland are due to its 
economic size in comparison to other countries 
taken into account. The most significant lagging 
in this indicator for Croatia was created in the last 
decade, following the financial crisis as it is shown 
in Table 2. 
To give a closer look at the Croatian economic 
integration into the global economy in terms of 
Country 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018
Croatia 63.51 76.06 84.86 75.64 93.90 101.09
Czech Republic 83.89 98.23 122.02 128.97 156.10 150.39
Hungary 78.26 136.99 127.35 158.35 169.84 168.28
Poland 43.68 60.79 70.27 82.11 95.90 107.20
Slovak Republic 111.24 110.70 148.68 154.12 183.12 192.35
Bulgaria 55.60 78.29 100.50 103.21 128.06 128.14
Romania 56.29 48.52 59.36 71.24 82.66 86.49
Source: World Bank (2020).
Table 2 Openness to trade (international trade as a percentage of GDP)
Figure 1 Croatia’s import and export of goods (mln EUR)
Source: WIIW according to Eurostat and Croatian Bureau of Statistics data (2019).
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trade, changes in goods import and export over the 
last 30 years are shown in Graph 1.
As shown in Graph 1, Croatia had the same timing 
and control problems with liberalizing markets and 
opening them to trade as some other developing 
countries. Imports grew faster than exports, 
creating a problem of phasing in liberalization. As 
Wachtel (2000) explains, this was due to import 
liberalization being easier to control, while exports 
are depending on the competition and access, and 
therefore less responsive to market liberalization. 
Thus, export markets take more time to develop 
and are less assured than import markets. This 
graph shows that the decrease of openness was 
mostly due to a sharp decline in imports of goods, 
which was due to the economic crisis, decreasing 
purchases of imported goods. The economic crisis 
that decreased Croatian GDP by more than 12% 
(WIIW, 2019) started in 2009 and has ended five 
years later, while in most of the other EU countries 
it ended already in 2010. After the crisis period, 
Croatia has returned to the path of increasing 
exports and imports, almost at same pace as other 
analysed countries. 
It is also important to analyse the level of 
participation in the GVCs and the structure of 
exports in order to see if Croatia has used the 
opportunity to reindustrialise and specialise in 
the new global context. Many firms in transition 
economies were based in industries that were 
not based on comparative advantages of these 
countries and their survival was relying on subsidies 
and similar government measures (Lin, 2015). In 
some cases, governments were over-focused on 
the Washington Consensus guidelines, leading 
to investments in unsTable and unproductive 
companies which resulted in decline or stagnation 
of the economy (Lin, 2015).
According to the research of Croatian economy 
participation in GVCs from 1995 to 2011 using WTO 
Trade in Value Added data (Kersan-Škabić, 2017), 
Croatian economy has a significant and almost not 
changing lag to the EU NMS in overall economy 
backward participation (measured as share of 
other countries value added in Croatian exports) 
and forward participation (measured as share of 
Croatian value added in other countries exports) 
in GVCs. Also, its manufacturing industry was the 
least included in GVCs among the EU NMS in the 
period from 2000 to 2014, according to the input-
output analysis, with lowest backward indicator 
and stagnating forward integration indicator at an 
average group value (Barišić, 2020). 
Thus, Croatia did not use the opportunity to improve 
its productivity through backward participation 
and did not show enough effort to improve its 
specialisation in specific tasks in these networks 
what can be seen through its forward participation. 
The reasons for relatively low participation in the 
global production network can be sought through 
the comparative analysis of export sectors and FDI 
inflow in selected countries over the last decades. 
Prior research have indicated GDP growth, previous 
participation in GVCs, FDI, development of the 
financial sector, the share of services in GDP, share 
of high-tech products in export, and level of wages 
as important determinants in EU countries (Kersan-
Škabić, 2019). 
Table 3 shows the share of manufacturing 
industry (including standard international trade 
classification - SITC 5, 6, 7 and 8) in merchandise 
exports of selected countries. 
Table 3 shows a different trend in Croatia in 
comparison to other countries. All countries 
besides Croatia have increased the share of the 
manufacturing industry in merchandise exports in 
Country 1995 2000 2005 2008 2010 2015 2018
Bulgaria n.a. 57 59 51 49 56 58
Czech Republic 82 88 88 87 86 89 91
Croatia 74 73 68 70 68 67 66
Hungary 68 86 85 80 83 n.a. 87
Poland 71 80 78 80 79 79 80
Romania 78 77 80 77 79 78 82
Slovak Republic 82 84 83 86 87 89 90
Source: World Bank (2019).
Table 3 Share of the manufacturing industry in merchandise exports (%)
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the period from 1995 to 2018, what can also be 
addressed to the Croatian low insertion in GVCs 
that are most prominent in the manufacturing 
industry. These results might reveal that most 
of the companies in the Croatian manufacturing 
sector were not viable, thus making the transition 
shock more of a hard time. As Lin (2015) points 
out „firms in an industry are viable in an open, 
competitive market only if the industry is consistent 
with the comparative advantage determined by the 
economy’s endowment structure“. Contemporary 
research point out the importance of understanding 
that trade liberalization does not create 
competition automatically and there is a need 
for promoting competition among export sectors. 
Table 4 shows the structure of all manufacturing 
industries exports share in total manufacturing 
industry exports of analysed countries according to 
ISIC classification in 2018.
Croatian share of exports in 2018 in the machinery 
and transport equipment (23%) is significantly 
lower than in Czech Republic (58%), Hungary (54%), 
Poland (37%), Romania (47%) and Slovakia (60%). 
This is also in line with the previously mentioned 
low participation in GVCs, given the fact that the 
transport industry, especially the automobile 
industry is one of the pioneers in GVC production. 
Meanwhile, other export components such as 
food and live animals (11%), crude materials (7%), 
mineral fuels, and related materials (11%) and 
chemicals (13%) had larger shares than other 
analysed countries. 
Lin (2015) suggested that the developing countries, 
especially  those in transition, should include the 
state in providing the information about new 
industries that would be consistent with the new 
comparative advantage, coordinating investments 
in related industries and improvements in 
infrastructure, subsidizing activities with 
externalities in the process of industrial 
upgrading and structural change and catalysing 
the development of new industries by incubation 
or by attracting foreign direct investment to 
overcome the deficits in social capital and other 
intangible constraints. Little of the mentioned 
was done in Croatia, although previous research 
show the importance of export development and 
improvement of trade relations for the Croatian 
economy growth (Bilas et al., 2015). Part of the 
companies were largely subsidised, such as 
shipbuilding, while a large share of monopolistic 
companies were sold to the foreign investors 
following the Washington consensus prescriptions. 
Given its recommendations, FDI has been in the 
mainstream of public policy, considered as the key 
development driver due to the potential technology 
and knowledge transfer and spillover effects. 
According to WIIW data (2019), over the period 
from 1993 to 2018 Croatia received an average 
of 275.4 EUR per capita FDI, what places Croatia 
behind Czech Republic (424. 4 EUR per capita) and 
Hungary (325.6 EUR per capita), while it was more 
successful in attracting FDI than Romania (147.5 
EUR per capita), Poland (205.5 EUR per capita), 
Bulgaria (246.13 EUR per capita), and Slovakia (263. 
8 EUR per capita). When comparing the amount of 
Industry/ Country Bulgaria Croatia Czech Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia
Food and live animals 11% 11% 3% 6% 11% 6% 3%
Beverages and tobacco 1% 2% 1% 1% 2% 1% 0%
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 6% 7% 2% 2% 2% 4% 2%
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related 
materials 9% 11% 2% 4% 3% 4% 4%
Animal and vegeTable oils, fats and 
waxes 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Chemicals and related products 10% 13% 6% 12% 9% 4% 4%
Manufactured goods classified chiefly 
by material 23% 17% 15% 11% 19% 17% 17%
Machinery and transport equipment 23% 23% 58% 54% 37% 47% 60%
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 13% 15% 12% 9% 17% 15% 10%
Commodities not classified elsewhere 3% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 0%
Source: World Bank (2019).
Table 4 Manufacturing industry sectors exports as a share (%) of total manufacturing industry exports of selected countries 
in 2018
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FDI as an average share of GDP (WIIW, 2019) results 
are slightly different, with Bulgaria on the first 
place due to several years of very high volumes of 
FDI before and upon joining the EU (making the 
average of 6.7%). Hungary is on the second place 
(4.6%), followed by Slovakia (3.7%), Czech Republic 
(3.4%), Croatia (3.4%), Romania (3.2%) and Poland 
(3.0%). 
In Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania, more than 70% of 
the FDI came from the EU-19 countries, while more 
than 80% was made by all EU member states (WIIW 
data, 2019). A large share of investment in this 
region was brownfield investment related to the 
privatisation process, especially of the local large 
monopolistic companies. The prevailing share of 
FDI in Croatia went to the financial service activities 
(more than 30%), while other most important 
sectors that in largest share received brownfield 
investment include real estate activities, wholesale 
trade, telecommunication, retail trade, manufacture 
of coke and refined petroleum products and 
manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products. It 
can be easily concluded that FDI in Croatia went 
mostly into non-production sectors, very often 
made through cherry-picking the industry leaders, 
while little included the manufacturing sector, 
unlike the other analysed countries (Jurčić and 
Barišić, 2018). 
The sectors receiving FDI also show that consumers 
might have benefited through cheaper goods 
produced by foreign affiliates, which could at the 
same time lead to weakening local producing 
positions and increasing imports (Lipsey, 2004). 
Jurčić and Barišić (2018) show that in the period 
from 2000 to 2016, only dividends and retained 
profits recorded within the BoP primary income 
have reached almost 60% return on the total equity 
investment in Croatia. It is also important to note 
that Croatia has received most of the FDI inflow 
before the financial crisis, and the only high inflows 
in the years that followed were connected to 
reinvested earnings in specific sectors. Thus, joining 
the EU in 2013 did not show to be as significant 
as expected for attracting FDI. Due to relatively 
high labour costs, Croatia was not so attractive to 
new EU investment, which has already been placed 
among other countries that have joined the EU 
before. 
Following neoliberal advice, Croatia did not form 
the FDI strategic sectors for developing its industry. 
This fact together with a relatively strong currency, 
made a large portion of its produced merchandise 
non-competitive on the global market, which led 
to a decrease of its industrial base. Even after the 
transition process ended Croatia remained sticking 
to the Washington Consensus recommendations 
without forming a broad industrial policy, what led 
to premature deindustrialisation. As shown in Table 
5, most of the analysed countries have increased 
their manufacturing share in GDP. Besides Croatia, 
which recorded a decrease from 18.5% in 1995 to 
12.3% in 2018, only Poland and Romania recorded 
a decrease of the manufacturing industry share in 
GDP, but at a lower rate. The experienced premature 
deindustrialisation (in GDP share and employment) 
in Croatia was also significantly different as it was 
not only in relative but also in absolute figures 
making Croatian continuing deindustrialisation 
significantly different than the one that developed 
countries have been experiencing which was 
mainly driven by rising GDP per capita and 
gravitating towards the service sector (Penava and 
Družić, 2014; Škuflić and Družić, 2016). While the 
deindustrialisation was taking place, on the other 
side the importance of tourism sector in Croatia 
was increasing forming a kind of Dutch disease. 
Country 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018
Bulgaria 9,8 12,2 13,6 11,1 13,3 13,5
Croatia 18,5 16,8 14,4 13,1 13,0 12,3
Czech Republic 21,5 23,6 23,0 21,2 24,1 23,1
Hungary 18,2 19,1 19,1 18,2 20,3 18,6
Poland 19,4 16,1 16,1 15,6 17,6 16,7
Romania 23,9 19,8 21,3 22,9 19,6 19,9
Slovakia 19,0 20,0 20,6 18,2 19,5 19,7
Source: World Bank (2019).
Table 5 Share (%) of manufacturing industry in GDP 
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Given the specifics of the tourism sector as it 
affects the results of the range of other sectors its 
GDP estimations are not so easy to give. The first 
satellite tourism account was made in 2019 for 
2016, showing to 11.4% contribution of tourism 
in GDP and 24% of share of gross value added of 
tourism activities in the overall gross value added 
(EIZ, 2019). These figures have been increasing 
in recent years and have been among the largest 
in the EU. According to EIZ (2019) the share of 
tourism in total exports amounted to 36.4% in 
2018, significantly contributing to the surplus of 
the current account.
Some of the main critiques of the Washington 
Consensus went for its ignoring national 
peculiarities and universal recipes (Babb, 2013), as 
it was the case with its implementation in Croatia. 
A more heterogeneous international regime being 
less uniform is needed and Croatia is yet to find its 
path to convergence through tailor-made industrial 
policy after the stagnating decades. Firstly, it needs 
to acknowledge the shortcomings of the previous 
development model and then plan a turn within 
its economic structure, that would make her ready 
for the challenges of the globalised world and the 
fourth industrial revolution.
4. Conclusion
GVCs have significantly changed the perspective 
of development policies, especially in developing 
countries. They brought a range of opportunities to 
countries, as they do not have to build the whole 
value chain within their borders, but can join a 
GVC through conducting a specific task within the 
production process. Thus, development policies 
changed from import-substitution industrialisation 
to export-oriented industrialisation. Export-
oriented industrialisation was further shaped 
through the Washington Consensus, that was 
regarded as a neoliberal agenda for developing 
countries offering general prescriptions mainly 
focusing on macroeconomic stability, privatisation 
and openness. Results of these guidelines have 
not been as expected and industrial policy is 
returning to the centre of the development debate. 
In its transition process Croatia has adopted the 
Washington Consensus neoliberal approach to 
development and disregarded industrial policy. 
During the last thirty years it became one of 
the least developed countries among EU NMS. 
Nominally, EU NMS did not have much different 
policies, but few aspects can be pointed out that 
made their development outcome different. It is 
important to emphasise that Croatian lagging 
behind the economies of the region started after 
the end of the 20th century and convergence to the 
developed European countries measured by GDP 
per capita was hardly existing since the pre-global 
financial crisis period.  This paper gave a short 
overview of the drawbacks Croatia has experienced 
following the Washington Consensus and provides 
lessons for other countries with similar economic 
structures that still have high expectations from 
implementing neoliberal guidelines. The main 
lesson from Croatian case is that focusing on 
tourism and neglecting the importance of the 
manufacturing industry can be one of the main 
culprits for countries' stagnation. Increasing share 
of tourism in Croatian GDP represents a form of the 
Dutch disease. Given the lower productivity growth 
rates in services compared to manufacturing, it 
reduces the GDP growth. After thirty years, Croatia 
has the second lowest share of manufacturing 
industry in GDP and the share has been continually 
decreasing, unlike in the other countries. The 
reason for this negative structural change can 
be sought in low participation in GVCs, both on 
the country level and in manufacturing industry, 
especially in the part of backward integration 
that enables the rise of productivity and focusing 
on specific tasks within the production process. 
Croatia attracted mostly market-seeking FDI, 
unlike in the Visegrad economies, which received 
more FDI in the manufacturing sector and have 
built up a strong industrial base primarily through 
joining GVCs. Given the relatively high salaries 
and strong local currency, the Croatian industry 
was further decreasing and giving rise to tourism. 
Thus, the second important lesson provided from 
the case of Croatia is the importance of joining 
the manufacturing industry GVCs and embracing 
development through upgrading within them. 
Also, while attracting FDI the emphasis should be 
on the export-oriented sectors where country has 
a comparative advantage and strives to develop it 
further. This paper also points out that although 
WTO accession and joining the EU are very 
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important for each country as they offer a range 
of opportunities, those are not enough to induce 
development. They need to be facilitated and 
integrated in countries policies. Having this and 
previous arguments in mind, the most important 
lesson is that neoliberal agenda formed in the 
Washington Consensus is not enough to achieve 
development and a country specific industrial 
policy design and implementation is needed in the 
global value chain era. Given the changing global 
environment affected by developments of GVCs 
and the Fourth industrial evolution, Croatia is yet 
to find the path to reindustrialise its economy using 
modern industrial policy measures. Country specific 
analysis and implementing tailor-made policies 
that could exploit the potential of the comparative 
advantages and develop them further are thus 
essential. More in-depth research on the connection 
of development policies and economic growth is yet 
to be examined, especially following the increasing 
industrial policy focus in development debates. 
Further research should recognise the complexity 
of different economic systems and provide analysis 
acknowledging them. 
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